Beitrag in einem Sammelband
Certification as Solution to the Asymmetric Information Problem?



Details zur Publikation
Autor(inn)en:
von Wangenheim, G.
Herausgeber:
Rott, Peter
Verlag:
Springer International Publishing
Verlagsort / Veröffentlichungsort:
Cham
Publikationsjahr:
2019
Seitenbereich:
11-22
Buchtitel:
Certification - Trust, Accountability, Liability
Titel der Buchreihe:
Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation
Bandnr.:
16
Jahrgang/Band:
16
ISBN:
978-3-030-02498-7
Sprachen:
Englisch

Zusammenfassung, Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the economic theory of
certification as a solution to the informational problems of experience
and credence goods. It starts with a non-technical presentation of the
basic economic model of certification based on a paper by Kip Viscusi
and then dwells on its variations: If one acknowledges that certifiers
themselves produce an experience or credence good, it becomes obvious
that certifiers are susceptible to the same temptations to hide or even
falsify information as the producers of the underlying experience or
credence goods. Certification of only a minimum quality is shown to be a
possible market equilibrium with negative effects on the spread of
qualities offered on the market. Heterogeneity of consumer preferences
is reported as one of the sources that may increase information
asymmetries between consumers and the certification agencies in the
model. Finally, the chapter takes a brief look at the structure of the
market for certifiers.



Autor(inn)en / Herausgeber(innen)

Zuletzt aktualisiert 2019-18-11 um 13:12