Aufsatz in einer Fachzeitschrift
Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of Limited Fee Shifting
Details zur Publikation
Autor(inn)en: | Carbonara, E.; Parisi, F.; von Wangenheim, G. |
Publikationsjahr: | 2015 |
Zeitschrift: | Review of Law and Economics |
Seitenbereich: | 113-148 |
Jahrgang/Band : | 11 |
ISSN: | 1555-5879 |
eISSN: | 1555-5879 |
DOI-Link der Erstveröffentlichung: |
URN / URL: |
Zusammenfassung, Abstract
In the past couple of decades, scholars have predominantly employedrent-seeking models to analyze litigation problems. In this paper, we buildon the existing literature to show how alternative fee-shifting arrangements (e.g., the American rule and English rule with limited fee-shifting) affect parties' litigation expenditures and their decisions to litigate. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, we discover that, when fee shifting is limited, the English rule presents some interrelated advantages over the Americanrule, including the reduction of litigation rates and the possible reductionof expected litigation expenditures. Our results unveil a hidden virtue oflimited fee shifting, showing that an increase in such limit may lead to adesirable sorting of socially valuable litigation.
In the past couple of decades, scholars have predominantly employedrent-seeking models to analyze litigation problems. In this paper, we buildon the existing literature to show how alternative fee-shifting arrangements (e.g., the American rule and English rule with limited fee-shifting) affect parties' litigation expenditures and their decisions to litigate. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, we discover that, when fee shifting is limited, the English rule presents some interrelated advantages over the Americanrule, including the reduction of litigation rates and the possible reductionof expected litigation expenditures. Our results unveil a hidden virtue oflimited fee shifting, showing that an increase in such limit may lead to adesirable sorting of socially valuable litigation.
