Journal article

Non-compete clauses, employee effort and spin-off entrepreneurship: A laboratory experiment



Publication Details
Authors:
Bünstorf, G.; Engel, C.; Fischer, S.; Güth, W.
Publisher:
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV

Publication year:
2016
Journal:
Research Policy: Policy, management and economic studies of science, technology and innovation
Pages range :
2113-2124
Volume number:
45
Start page:
2113
End page:
2124
Number of pages:
12
ISSN:
0048-7333
DOI-Link der Erstveröffentlichung:


Abstract
We experimentally test the effect of enforceable non-compete clauses on working effort and spin-off entrepreneurship. An employee invests effort in the probability of a profitable innovation. After a successful innovation the employee may want to start her own spin-off firm and compete with her prior employer. In the baseline setup without non-compete clause, spin-offs result from failed negotiation about employee compensation even though they reduce the joint payoffs of both parties. In two treatments with non-compete clause the employer can prevent successful innovators from leaving the firm. We find no significantly negative effect of non-compete clauses on employee effort, even if compensation is low. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


Keywords
Effort, Non-compete clause, Reciprocity Fairness, Spin-off entrepreneurship


Authors/Editors

Last updated on 2022-20-04 at 14:40