The assumption that the truth of facts is at the centre of knowledge crises would seem to suggest fact-checking or providing additional facts as methods of resolution. In this paper, this is being reflected by utilizing two complementary perspectives: an epistemological approach guided by theoretical positions from Philosophy of Science and a pragmalinguistic approach using methods of Applied Discourse Analysis. We argue that although facts are necessary in science communication, they are not su cient. Instead, we suggest focusing on this question: To what extent do we consider a statement plausible? By dissecting a historical and a present case (geocentrism, climate change) and applying the complementary approaches described above, the relevance of their respective epistemic systems (Goldman 2010) and what we call ‘settings of comprehension’ can be revealed. In this process, it can be demonstrated why what some people consider absurd, others consider plausible, and vice versa. On this basis, science communication can operate from a more deliberate level.